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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

3 SEP 1975


Intelligence Community Staff

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Plans and Resources  
National Security Agency  
Central Security Service

SUBJECT : Intelligence Production Improvement  
Initiatives

REFERENCE : NSA/CSS Memorandum, dated 26 August 1975,  
Subject as Above, Serial: N 0975

Your interest in having NSA's proposals for intelligence production improvements is acknowledged. As you know members of our staffs have discussed NSA's participation in looking at the various proposals. As we proceed in the development of the FY 1977 budget, our staffs will continue to work closely to ensure that details on your proposals and projects are available for consideration.

  
Samuel V. Wilson  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy to the DCI for the  
Intelligence Community

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IC 75-2452

25 JUL 1975

Dr. Edward W. Proctor  
Deputy Director for Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Ed:

During recent meetings of the NSCIC Working Group, Ambassador Ellsworth and other members have pressed for the production of a paper on the problem of how to explicitly state uncertainties in intelligence estimates. I would like to bring you up to date on this matter, and request your assistance.

This is not exactly a new problem, as anyone familiar with Sherman Kent's efforts to wrestle with it will remember. Yet it is clear that high-level users of intelligence are still seized with it. Accordingly I have seen to it that briefings to the NSCIC Working Group address points related to probabilities and confidence levels on topics such as SALT, MBFR, and Warning.

Members of the Working Group welcomed these responses but suggested that together they provide only "30-40 percent" of the answer to the broad question. The Group wishes us now to cover the problem of expressing uncertainties in the "softer" areas--e.g., in political judgments. I have agreed to see what could be done.

In this connection, I would like to draw on the expertise in the DDI. There would be value--I believe--in a study that reviews the various attacks on the problem over the years and draws some general conclusions on where we now stand.

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**Sincerely,**

/s/ Samuel V. Wilson

**Samuel V. Wilson  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy to the DCI for the  
Intelligence Community**

**cc: Director of Political  
Research**

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